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ABSTRACT
Efficient Market Responses to Error-Ridden Money Supply Announcements
Peter Orazem and Barry Falk '
July, 1984
This study introduces a model of optimal market response to announced esti
mates of changes in economic aggregates when the estimates are known to be subject
to error. We show that under fairly general conditions, rational economic agents
will not take the announcements at face value, but will attempt to extract their
own perception of the true change conditional on the announcement. Ignoring this
signal extraction process can lead to incorrect conclusions regarding the behav
ioral response of asset prices to money supply shocks. The model is shown to be
consistent with the data on the response of interest rates to money supply
announcements.
1. Introduction
Efficient Market Kesponses to Error-Ridden
Money Supply Announcements
In recent years, numerous studies have estimated the response of asset prices
to announced government estimates of economic aggregates. Most commonly, these
studies have analyzed the response of asset prices (or yields) to the unanticipated
and anticipated components of the Federal Reserve's weekly money supply announce
ments.—^ Using regression methods, the estimated coefficients on the unanticipated
and anticipated components of the announcement are typically interpreted to be the
market's response to perceived unanticipated and emticipated money supply changes,
respectively. In other words, these studies assiane that private agents accept the
Ted's announcements at face value, completely ignoring the fact that these
announcements are contaminated by estimation errors.
This study introduces a model of the optimal market response to announced
estimates of change in economic aggregates when the estimates are known to be sub
ject to error. Under fairly general conditions, we show that rational agents will
not take such estimates literally, particularly if they intend to respond only to
true changes in these aggregate measures. Instead, they will attempt to extract
their own perception of the true change conditional on the announcement which they
will view as a noisy signal of the truth. An implication of the theory is that
studies which equate an agent's perception of the money supply change with an
announced money supply change can lead to incorrect conclusions regarding the
behavioral response of asset prices to money supply shocks.
In the next section we formalize this argument in terras of optimal signal
extraction theory. In the third section we consider some implications of the
theory for econometric practice which we apply in Section 4. Our main results and
conclusions are summarized in Section 3.
2. Theoretical Model
A. Motivation
The basic model which has been used extensively to measure the response of
asset yields to weekly money supply announcements can be written as
^ =^0 "vl.t ^ ^"t .
where is the change in an asset's yield over a short time interval that includes
E
the Fed's money supply announcement during week t; M. is the change in the money
A,t
supply that the public predicts the Fed will announce during week t; and , M^ ^ is
the surprise component of the announced money supply change (i.e., the actual
announced change minus u is a zero mean, serially uncorrelated disturbance
A 5 U C
process. While individual studies differ according to the choice of an asset, the
length of the interval over which the asset's price change is measured, the
measurement of the anticipated component of the announcement, and the functional
form used, for present purposes these differences are not particularly important
and (1) captures the essential common structure that they share.
Equation (1) implicitly assumes that the public accepts the Fed's announcement
at face value . This would be true if the Fed's announcement reflected all of the
relevant information available to the market at the time of the announcement.
However, this seems unlikely. The Fed's weekly announcements are based on data
collected from a small subset of the domestic chartered banks. Thus, it seems
reasonable to suppose that the market has information about the money supply which
is unavailable to the Fed, just as the Fed's announcement contains information that
was unavailable to the market. In general, provided that the information sets for
the Fed and the public are distinct (i.e., neither information set is a proper
subset of the other) the market can do better than to accept the Fed's announce
ments at face value. In particular, our theory generates an estimation scheme for
the market, conditional on the Fed's announcement, that results in a more efficient
2/
estimate than that of the Fed.— In other words, rational agents will attempt to
extract information on the true money supply from the Fed's error-ridden announce
ment. This signal extraction process can have serious implications for commonly
used empirical tests of market efficiency and for the interpretation of estimated
responses to money supply announcements.
B. The Signal-Extraction Model
Consider an agent's response to an unanticipated announced change in the money
supply, . In general, this unanticipated portion of the announcement will be
A,t
contaminated by measurement error. Thus, ^ can be decomposed as follows
«A,.
Twhere is the true money supply innovation and e^ is the Fed's initial reporting
3/error (i.e., its initial announcement minus its subsequent revised estimate).— If
Tagents had perfect information regarding the values of and e^ we assume that
they would respond only to the true money supply innovation. In the absence of
such information the agents will respond to their best guess of the true component
of the money supply announcement. That is, (1) can be written as
^0* ' Vt ^
T ^where and e^ are, respectively, the agents' best estimates of the true and error
components of the unexpected portion of the Fed's money supply announcement at t.
Our previous argument would imply that a^ be equal to zero. Therefore, we will
proceed under the assumption that is equal to zero. It remains to determine the
^ T
agents optimal calculation of
We propose the following model. Let E ^ denote the agents' esti
mate of conditioned upon the unanticipated and anticipated components of the
4/
Ted's money supply announcement at t.— Then
which (since we have assumed that a^ = 0) can be combined with (3) to obtain
^ + a,E[M3 m'iJ _ ^] + a-M^ . + v. (5)
t 0 I t A,t' Ajt-* 3 A,t t
For simplicity we will henceforth define the conditional expectation in (4) as the
best linear predictor of on and ^We then generate a solution to (5)
t L A| C
that can easily be compared to (1).
X U E »
To find the projection of M on M and M we formulate the following
t A j t " I C
f T >2problem. Find constant values for and ot^ to minimize J subject
to
= a + + a C6)
t 0 __1 A,t 2 A,t
TAssume that the unconditional means of and e^ in (2) are equal to zero and that
is orthogonal to Then the solution to the projection problem is
A^t AIC
Qq = ° "l ° '^^ T * °T " ^®t^ '
and 0^^ =Cov(m^, e^).—^ For convenience we will simply denote as a from now
on. Thus the solution to (5) is
SO that (7) is our estimable version of (3). Notice that (7) and (1) differ only
in that in (1) is equal to in (7). We will discuss the importance of this
distinction in the next section. To understand the intuition behind the dis
tinction, note that ct represents the weight that a rational agent will place on the
Fed's announcement. The optimal weight derived from the signal extraction theory
is the proportion of the total variance of unanticipated money announcements due to
true changes in the money supply. The parameter bj^ will equal a^^ only if a - 1
which corresponds to the case where *= 0, i.e., there are no random errors
in the Fed's money announcements. So long as there is a stochastic component to
8/
the Fed's announcement errors, ot will not equal one. In fact, a can be positive
9/
or negative and can be greater than or less than one in absolute value
3. Implications
In this section we discuss the implications of the theory for empirically
analyzing the response of asset prices to announced estimates of the money supply.
We first consider how error-ridden announcements complicate the derivation of
inferences of behavioral responses to true unanticipated money supply shocks. Then
we extend the analysis to consider testing for structural changes in these behav
ioral responses over time. Finally we analyze the theory's implications for
standard tests of efficient markets.
A. Interpreting Responses to Announcements
In a number of studies of the relationship between asset price changes and
money supply announcements, economists have suggested that the parameter b^^ in (1)
can be interpreted as the behavioral response of asset prices to the market's
perceptions of the money supply innovation. We have already argued that bj^ will,
in general, be a biased estimate of a^ which according to (3) measures the actual
behavioral response. The implications of this bias go beyond the obvious problem
of underestimating or overestimating the magnitude of a^^ by using b^^ as a proxy.
For example, Cornell [1] has suggested that the sign of b^^ can be used to evaluate
various hypotheses regarding how perceived money supply changes influence asset
prices since these hypotheses differ as to the direction of change in various asset
prices in response to a perceived money supply innovation. He argues, for example,
that a perceived positive money supply innovation would tend to generate an
increase in the dollar price of foreign currency according to the "Expected Infla
tion Hypothesis" but would generate a decrease in that price according to the
"Keynesian Hypothesis."—^ However, as we have shown above, knowing the direction
of the change in an asset's price in response to a surprise money supply announce
ment (i.e., knowing the sign of bj^) does not allow one to directly infer the direc
tion of the change to a true (or what is believed to be a true) money supply
innovation (i.e., the sign of example, <x is equal to zero then b^
will also equal zero regardless of the sign and magnitude of a^^. If ot is negative
then and a^ will be of opposite signs. Even if ct is positive, b^ will yield the
correct information on the magnitude of the market's response to true money supply
shocks only if there are no measurement errors in the Fed's announcements or if the
market accepts the Fed estimates at face value
B, Testing for Structural Change
A second problem arises when equation (1) is used to test for structural
changes in market responses to money supply innovations. Typically, studies will
divide the sample into pre and post October 1979 components to assess whether the
market is responding differently to perceived money supply innovations after the
12/ ...
Fed's announced policy changes.— The problem is that accepting or rejecting the
equality of across the sample periods says nothing about the equality of aj^
across the sample periods unless ct is unchanged. However, a will change any time
there are changes in the way that the Fed estimates weekly money supply changes.
Such changes will alter the distribution of the Fed's measurement errors, e^. and
since c* depends upon the moments of this distribution, will change the public's
interpretation of an announcement surprise of a given magnitude in a systematic
manner. This, in turn, will result in a change in the value of bj^ in (1) even if
the market response a^^ remains unchanged. Aproper test of the stability of a^^
would require the use of a regression model such as (5), controlling for the error
structure of the Fed's announcements.
C, Testing the Efficient Markets Hypothesis
The final issue we consider regards the possibility of uncovering lagged
responses to error-ridden announcements. The conventional interpretation of the
Efficient Markets Hypothesis is that asset markets should respond quickly to n^w
information. Therefore, if the market takes the Fed announcement as true, then
the response to the Fed's weekly money supply announcement should be completed soon
after the announcement. Our theory suggests that even if these markets are effi
cient (in the sense that asset prices respond to only new information about the
actual behavior of the money supply), there could still be lagged responses by the
market to the Fed's announcement. The reason is that at the time of the announce
ment, agents respond to their estimate of the actual money supply innovation. Over
time, these estimates will be revised. As agents revise their estimates of the
true component of the unanticipated announcement, asset prices will continue to
respond. In fact, Urich [5] has presented evidence of significant lagged responses
to unanticipated monetary announcements on the day after the announcement. In the
post October 1979 period we find weak evidence of a lagged response on the second
13/
day after the announcement.— Further indirect evidence that the market continues
to learn about and respond to the true component of the announcement is the fact
that the Fed's revisions to earlier announcements seem to have no effect on asset
14/prices.— Presumably, if the market were taking the Fed announcement at face
value, Fed revisions should be informative, particularly since these revisions can
be substantial. Since the revisions appear to have no informational content, one
can infer that the market has managed to completely decompose the money supply
announcement into its true and error components within the one week period.
4. Empirical Resu11s
In this section we use several methods suggested by our previous discussion to
estimate the response of Treasury bill yields to perceived money supply innova
tions. We show how the parameter characterizing that response can be recovered
from an estimate of the response of asset price changes to the unanticipated com
ponent of weekly money supply announcements over periods in which the joint distri
bution of the money supply process and the money supply estimation process are
stable. We also suggest and execute a test of the signal extraction theory pro
posed above. The results of this test lend support to that theory and consequently
to our critique of conventional approaches to the problem.
A. Indirect Estimation of
Equation (7) indicates that the behavioral response to perceived money supply
shocks, a^, can easily be estimated if a is known. Since a can be estimated from
the sample moments of the joint distribution of e and M , we can estimate a, as
t t' 1
the coefficient on cm"' . Since a (and therefore can be estimated for each
A, C
subsample (i.e.. before and after October 1979). we can test for structural change
in the response to perceived money supply shocks, independently of changes in the
error structure of the Fed*s announcement.
Following Cornell. [1], we measured changes in the announced money supply as
the weekly percentage change in the narrowly defined money stock as reported in the
Federal Reserve's H.6 release. We decompose this announcement into its anticipated
) and unanticipated components (m"). Our measure of anticipated money
A ^
announcements is taken as, the median of the Money Market Services, Inc., Thursday
survey.^^ Following a suggestion by Roley [2] , we revise the survey data to
account for new information in the period when only the Tuesday survey data are
available. We also decompose the unanticipated money supply announcement into its
true and error components. The unanticipated error, e^., is defined as the ini
tially announced money supply growth minus the subsequent revision. The true
unanticipated money growth is the difference between the unanticipated announcement
and the error. The measure of the initial asset yield change (R^.) we chose to use
is the change in the yield of outstanding three-month U.S. Treasury bills from the
close of the market at 3:30 p.m. on the day of the Fed's 4:00 p.m. weekly announce-
16/
ment to the close after the announcement.—
We divide the sample into two periods: before and after the October 1979
change in the Fed's monetary policy. The first sample begins on January 5, 1978
and ends on October 4, 1979. The second sample covers the October 11, 1979 through
January 13, 1984 period. We first obtain the sample moments of the joint distribu
tion of M^ and e^. In the first period a^= 0.0018, 0.005 and -0.44x10 .
Therefore a« 1.06 for this period. In the second period, 0^= 0.0027, 0^= 0.005,
and a -0.59^10"^, and so a = 0.94. In other words, the sample moments indicate
10
that the error variance in the Fed announcements rose while the variance of the
true component remained the same. Consequently, rational agents should have put 15
percent less weight on Fed announcements in the second sample than they did in the
first.
Having estimates of ot for each period we can estimate (7) to deduce a^ . These
results are reported in Table 1. The regressions show that the anticipated compo
nent of the announcement has no significant effect on Treasury bill yields in
either period. The estimate of a^^ in the first period is 6.69 and in the second
period it increases to 34.4.—^ The hypothesis that the behavioral response to
perceived money supply shocks is equal across the two periods is easily rejected at
the .01 level
B, Testing the Theory
To test the signal extraction theory we have outlined above, we must obtain an
estimate of aj^ more directly than the estimate we obtained in the previous section.
Then we can test whether the direct estimate of a^ differs significantly from the
value we obtained indirectly from the restrictions implied by the signal extraction
model. To directly estimate a^^ , consider the case of rational agents who happen to
always know the true component of the unanticipated announcement exactly. These
agents should respond only to that component of the announcement so that in the
regression model
where w is a disturbance term, c would equal zero and c. would be equal to a..
In the case of the Treasury bill market the only way to make this scenario opera
tional is to allow for a time interval long enough for the market's participants to
11
know and exactly. While it is possible that the market determines the true
values of and e^ before the revision is announced, it is certain the market will
know these values once the revisions are announced. This implies that we should
measure the change in the asset's yield from immediately before the first announce
ment to the close following the revision one week later. Then, estimates of and
c^ in (8) should be unbiased estimates of a^ and a^ in (3). Thus, a test of the
signal extraction theory we have proposed is to jointly test the hypotheses that c^
in (8) equals aj^ in (3) and that c^ is equal to zero in (8). This can be extended
to simultaneously test for efficient markets by adding the restriction that a^
equals zero in (3).
The estimates of equation (8) are reported in Table 2. In both samples only
the true component of the unanticipated announcement has a significant effect on
Treasury bill yields. More importantly, we cannot reject the joint hypotheses
implied by our theory of efficient market responses in the presence of noisy infor-
19/ • •
mation for either period.— Further, when we supress the anticipated announcement
20/variable we cannot reject the restriction that c^^ equals a^^ in either sample.—
We take this to be strong support for the notion that rational agents will take the
government forecast errors into account when responding to announcements of
economic aggregates.
5. Conclusion
This paper illustrates that the response of Treasury bill yields to announced
money supply changes is consistent with a model in which rational agents take the
Fed's estimation errors into account in formulating their notion of actual money
supply changes. Such agents can "do better" than to accept the Fed's announcement
12
at face value in the sense that the variance of their estimation errors will be
smaller than the Fed's. One could, of course, argue that we are wrong to suppose
that market participants decompose money supply announcement surprises into their
estimates of the true and error components in the manner we suggested. Itowever, so
long as these agents use any device to execute such a decomposition, our critique
of conventional approaches to interpreting the response to money supply announce
ments remains valid.
The Fed has recently proposed that noise be deliberately added to the weekly
announcement by, for example, using weighted averages or seasonally adjusted data.
The reason is that, in the Fed's view, too much emphasis is placed on what may be
unreliable data. By making the data even less reliable the Fed believes that the
public's response to its announcements will be diminished. Our theory of how
rational agents respond to error-ridden money supply announcements predicts that as
2 . ....
these announcements become noisier (i.e., increases) the market s initial
response to the announcements will be d^mipened (since a will decrease). However,
the behavioral response to the perceived money supply change, a^^, will remain
unchanged.
The model has numerous applications to analogous cases of markets with error"
ridden announcements. In recent years, errors in generating the Consumer Price
Index, Gross National Product, agricultural acreage measures, and crop yield
statistics have been alleged to have caused commodity and asset markets to respond
perversely. It would be interesting to observe if these relationships could also




Empirical Results of the Model: = aQ + ^t
Estimate Coefficients
2
Sample Period ' aQ aj^ a^ R
1/5/78 - 11/4/79 .047 6.69 -4.64 .10
(3.63) (2.93) (1.53)
11/11/79 - 1/13/84 .05 34.35 -6.63 .21
(2.32) (7.46) (1.27)
Notes: The dependent variable^ is the change in yield on 90 d.ay Treasury bills from
immediately before a money supply announcement to the close on the following market
day. t-statistics are in parentheses. oi is assumed to equal 1.06 in the earlier
period and .94 in the later period.
14
Table 2
Empirical Results of the Ifodel: ™*^0 ^ l^t * '^ 2®t *
Estimate Coefficients
Sample Period Cq Cj^ ^2Co R
2
1/5/78 - 11/4/79 .094 13.44 7.63 .055
(3.22) (2.15) (.440)
11/11/79 - 1/13/84 .029 33.05 30.13 .05
(.610) (3.33) (1.57)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in yield on 90 day Treasury bills from
immediately before a money supply announcement to the close after the announced
revision, t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Footnotes
—^The list of these studies is quite lengthy. The most recent of these are
papers by Cornell [1], Roley [2], and, Roley and Walsh [3].
—^It is debatable as to whether the Fed has access to all of the information
incorporated in the private sectors' money supply estimates. Our theoretical model
and empirical results are consistent with the view that the market has information
which is unavailable to the Fed. These results are also consistent with the Fed
having access to all market information but, for whatever reason, not utilizing
this information in its estimation process. In this event, our theory provides a
simple way for the Fed to improve upon its initial estimates of the money supply.
—^At the time of each announcement the Fed also announces an initial revision
to the previous week's announcement and a second revision to the money supply
change originally announced two weeks earlier. In addition, the Fed occassionally
will revise data pertaining to much earlier announcements. Here we are assuming
that the initial revision reveals the truth. Our theoretical analysis is unaffect
ed by this simplifying assumption and much of the empirical work we present was
done using both initial and second revisions with no substantive differences being
apparent.
Others, such as Roley [2], and , Roley and Walsh [3], also used (initial)
revision data in models of asset price responses to money supply announcements.
However, these studies consider responses to revisions once the revisions are
announced to the public. Our point is that account should be taken of the public's
incentive to deduce the revision before that time.
4/ ...— We are assuming that the only source of new information at the time of the
announcement comes from the announcement itself. It will turn out that only the
16
unanticipated component of the announcement provides "relevant" new information but
ve leave that result to be derived.
—^Our main conclusions are not sensitive to this assumption. See Sargent [4]
for a discussion of projection theory and its application to signal extraction
problems.
—^These assumptions seem reasonable, a priori, if we assume that the Fed and
the public use their respective information sets efficiently. In fact, our sample
T
statistics support these assumptions. The sample mean of is -0.00007 with a
standard error of 0.0052 and the sample mean of ej.is -0.0002 with a standard error
of 0.0025. The correlation between and ^ was insignificantly different
A,t A,t
from zero for both parts of our sample.
—^The first order conditions to this problem, found by differentiating
E(M^ - 0^ - ^ with respect to , respectively, are
- "o - - a2«A,t) =0 (O
Since E(M^) « E(m" ^) = 0 and E(mV ) = E(M^ ^ 0" conditions (i) and
C A^ L C A|C A|C
(iii) reduce to ) and J respectively. If
0 2 A,t 0 A,t 2 A,T
is constant then there are an infinite number of solutions for ol and a all
A,t u z
E E .
of which, however, imply that a + - 0. If M. is a nontrivial random
U ^A^w A^C
variable then E(l^ ^ t^^ only solution is ° 0- Thus, in
E f T U U 1any case, t " ^ condition (ii) reduces to E[(M^ - t '^^ A t°
U 11* ,
Replacing M. with the sum of M and e , then taking expectations and solving for
A ^ C C C
Oj, provides the solution given in the text.
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—^If a ^ 1, the signal extraction process yields estimates of the true money
supply change that are better than the Fed's estimates. In other words, the error
variance using the signal extraction process should be lower than the Fed's estima
tion error. This prediction is borne out in the empirical work reported below.
—^This can be easilty established. Let > 0, ^ ^ ^eT ^
denominator of a can be shown to always be positive using the Cauchy-Schwartz
inequality. If cr <0 and ] cr |,> the numerator will be negative, as will a.
0 7 0T I X
If + a „ < 0 then a > 1 and if 0 > 2a^ + + 3a then a < -1.
e eT 1 6 s-'-
See Cornell [1], pp. 645-7.
—^We will eventually argue that the data do not support the view that the
Fed's estimates are taken literally. In particular we will point to the presence
of a lagged response to the announcement and the absence of a response to the
announced revision as evidence in this regard. Footnote 8 is also relevant.
-^^See, for example, Cornell [1] and Roley [2].
—^We can reject the hypothesis that an unanticipated Friday announcement has
no effect on changes in 90 day Treasury bill yields from the market's Monday close
to its Tuesday close at the .1 significance level.
Roley [2] finds no effect of revisions on yield changes. Our replication of
Roley's regressions using different sample periods corroborates his findings.
—^See Roley [2] for a description of these data. We thank Kim Rupert of Money
Market Services, Inc. for providing these data to us.
-^^Other work we have done suggests that the basic results are not very sensi
tive to a finer time interval.
-^^The corresponding values for b^ are 7.1 and 32.2, respectively. Thus, bj^
overestimates the response to perceived money supply shocks by 6 percent in the
18
first period and underestimates it by 7 percent in the second period. Thus, the
bias is toward accepting the hypothesis of no change in the behavioral response
across these two samples.
18/
—The F-statistic is 14.9. Without correcting for the signal extraction
problem the F-statistic would have been 11.7. Although the conclusion is not
sensitive to the correction in this particular case, it is clear that the potential
for perverse conclusions exists in analogous tests for structural change in the
responses of agents to error-ridden announcements.
19/ • •
•— In the first sample, the F-statistic was .616 which is below the critical
value of 2.66 at the .05 significance level. In the second sample, the F-statistic
was 1.72 which is below the critical value of 2.62 at the .05 significance level.
20/ . . . .
—In the first sample the F-statistic was .895 which is below the critical
value of 3.90 at the .05 significance level. In the second sample, the F-statistic
was .268 which is below the critical value of 3.86 at the .05 significance level.
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